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Abstract 
This paper seeks to answer the following question: What is a minimal set of entities that form an 
ontology of the natural world, given our well-established physical theories? The proposal is that 
the following two axioms are sufficient to obtain such a minimalist ontology: (1) There are 
distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. (2) The matter points are 
permanent, with the distances between them changing. I sketch out how one can obtain our well-
established physical theories on the basis of just these two axioms. The argument for 
minimalism in ontology then is that it yields all the explanations that one can reasonably demand 
in science and philosophy, while avoiding the drawbacks that come with a richer ontology. 
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1. Formulating a minimalist ontology 
Any form of a naturalistic metaphysics uses science, notably fundamental physics, as the 
guide to ontology. However, one cannot read off the ontology from the mathematical 
structure of a physical theory. The first and foremost purpose of such a structure is to obtain a 
simple and informative representation of the evolution of a given domain of entities. The 
mathematical structure uses whatever parameters are appropriate to achieve that aim, but 
these parameters do not thereby automatically become part of the ontology of the theory. To 
mention just one prominent example, consider the wave function, which is the central 
mathematical innovation of quantum physics. It is without doubt a parameter that fulfils the 
mentioned purpose, but there is an ongoing dispute about what, if any, its ontological 
significance is. Thus, even if one endorses scientific realism and adopts a naturalistic stance 
in metaphysics, philosophical argument is called for to develop a proposal for an ontology of 
a given physical theory, or physics tout court. 
One way to approach ontology is to draw a distinction between what can be called the 
primitive ontology of a given physical theory and what is its dynamical structure. The 
primitive ontology are those entities that, according to the theory, exist simply in the world. 
The dynamical structure of a physical theory then is made up by all those parameters that are 
introduced through their function for the evolution of those entities that constitute the 
primitive ontology. Note that this notion of a primitive ontology is much wider than the sense 
in which this term is used in the debate about the foundations of quantum mechanics (see 
Dürr et al. 2013, p. 29 (first published 1992), and Allori et al. 2008): a primitive ontology in 
this wide sense does not necessarily have to consist in entities that are localized in three-
dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time (and what about space or space-time 
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themselves?). Nonetheless, the paradigmatic example of a primitive ontology is this one: 
according to Newtonian classical as well as Bohmian quantum mechanics, point particles 
localized in three-dimensional space are what simply exists. Parameters such as momentum 
and gravitational mass in Newtonian mechanics as well as the wave function in Bohmian 
quantum mechanics then are central elements of the dynamical structure, because they are 
introduced in terms of their function for the evolution of the particle configuration. 
In a second step, one can move on from the primitive ontology of a given theory to 
primitive ontology tout court, that is, seek to work out a proposal about what the entities are 
that simply exist in the world, given our best physical theories. The rationale for doing so is 
that naturalistic metaphysics strives for an ontology of the natural world that is not relative to 
particular physical theories. One may even go as far as claiming that it is inappropriate to 
speak of the ontology of this or that theory. Ontology is about what there is. It goes without 
saying that our access to what there is comes through the representations that we conceive in 
terms of physical theories. But this does not imply that ontology is relative to particular 
theories, because it is misguided to seek to infer ontology from the mathematical structure of 
physical theories. In other words, the idea is to search for an answer to the following question: 
What is a minimal set of entities that form an ontology of the natural world, given our well-
established physical theories? 
Consider how Jackson (1994, p. 25) describes the task of metaphysics: 
Metaphysics, we said, is about what there is and what it is like. But of course it is concerned not 
with any old shopping list of what there is and what it is like. Metaphysicians seek a 
comprehensive account of some subject matter – the mind, the semantic, or, most ambitiously, 
everything – in terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions. In doing this they are 
following the good example of physicists. The methodology is not that of letting a thousand 
flowers bloom but rather that of making do with as meagre a diet as possible. 
This paper is concerned with formulating a proposal for “as meagre a diet as possible” when 
it comes to the ontology of the natural world. Of course, parsimony cannot be the only 
criterion. Coherence and empirical adequacy are further criteria that have to be satisfied. The 
latter includes being in the position to tell a story how the established physical theories can be 
construed on the basis of such a minimalist ontology. 
In this section, I set out the proposal for a minimalist ontology in as general and as precise a 
manner as possible on a few pages. In the next section, I point out how this proposal is able to 
cover all established physical theories, from classical mechanics to relativistic physics and 
quantum physics, including quantum field theory. The remarks in that respect have to be quite 
sketchy and refer the reader to other published work, given the limited scope of a single 
paper. The aim of this paper is to make a case for minimalism as methodology in the 
metaphysics of science. In this vein, the third section gives an argument why minimalism is 
capable of yielding all the explanations that one can reasonably demand in science and 
philosophy. A brief conclusion then sums up the case for a minimalist ontology. 
The foremost reason for singling out parsimony as the primary criterion for ontology is that 
for any candidate entity stemming from science – or common sense, or intuitions –, we need 
an argument why one should endorse an ontological commitment to that entity. Its being part 
of what is minimally sufficient to obtain an ontology of the natural world that is coherent and 
empirically adequate is the best argument for an ontological commitment. Given our 
cognitive situation, what we can strive for is minimal sufficiency, but not necessity or a priori 
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knowledge when using parsimony as a guideline for the ontology of the natural world. The 
argument for not going beyond parsimony in one’s ontological commitments then is that it is 
an illusion to think that by enriching the ontology, one achieves explanations that are deeper 
than those that a parsimonious ontology can yield; one thereby runs only into artificial 
problems and impasses, as I shall argue in section 3. 
How can we set up such a parsimonious ontology? A first consideration is that in order to 
have a chance of being empirically adequate, a parsimonious ontology still has to endorse a 
plurality of objects. The objects better be simple for the ontology to be parsimonious, but 
there has to be a plurality of them. Even if one defends the view known as priority monism 
(Schaffer 2010b) – that is, the ontological priority of the one entity that is the whole universe 
–, one has to include an internal differentiation of the one whole into a plurality of objects. 
This implies that there are fundamental relations that carry out that internal differentiation 
(Schaffer 2010a). If relations have to be recognized anyway (pace Heil 2012, ch. 7, and Lowe 
2016), one can employ them to individuate simple objects (that is, objects that do not have 
parts or any other internal structure). The numerical plurality of these objects then is not a 
primitive, but derives from the relations that individuate them. In consequence, I take the 
following two statements of ontology to be equivalent: (a) There is one whole (i.e. the 
universe) exhibiting an internal differentiation in terms of relations that individuate a plurality 
of simple objects within the whole. (b) There are relations that individuate simple objects so 
that the relations and the objects make up a configuration that is the universe. In the 
following, I shall prefer the vein of the latter formulation, relying on the relational holism 
conceptualized in Pettit (1993, ch. 4) and Esfeld (1998). The decisive issue is that the objects 
are not independent of each other, but individuated by relations. 
Generally speaking, one can conceive different types of relations making up different sorts 
of worlds. For instance, one may imagine thinking relations that individuate mental objects 
making up a world of Cartesian minds. Lewis’s hypothetical basic relations of like-
chargedness and opposite-chargedness, by contrast, would not pass the test, since, as Lewis 
(1986b, p. 77) notes himself, these relations fail to individuate the objects that stand in them 
as soon as there are at least three objects. When it comes to the natural world, the issue are 
relations that qualify as providing for extension, at least if one follows Descartes’ argument 
that extension is indispensable in an ontology of the natural world (Principles of Philosophy, 
book II, §§ 4-5). In any case, relations providing for extension – that is, distances – are, given 
the state of the art in both physics and philosophy, the first choice for an ontology of the 
natural world that is to be empirically adequate. To put it differently, no one has hitherto 
worked out a proposal for another type of relations than distances that could (a) do the trick of 
individuating simple objects and (b) be empirically adequate. The situation may change in a 
future theory of quantum gravity. However, as things stand, we are quite far from a physical 
theory of quantum gravity that includes matter and that is empirically adequate in providing a 
link with experimental data (measurement outcomes). 
Hence, one axiom of our envisaged minimalist ontology has to introduce relations that 
individuate simple objects. But this is not sufficient, since the universe is not static. To 
achieve empirical adequacy, we need a second axiom that introduces an evolution of the 
configuration defined by the first axiom. In Cartesian terms, we need not only extension, but 
also motion. The simplest way to do this is to stipulate that the relations admitted as basic 
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change. We thus get to an ontology that is defined by the following two axioms, and only 
these axioms: 
(1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. 
(2) The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing. 
The claim of this paper is that these two axioms are minimally sufficient to formulate an 
ontology of the natural world that is empirically adequate. To stress again, the issue is 
minimal sufficiency. There is no claim about these axioms being necessary or a priori. They 
are fallible. 
Indeed, these axioms are conceived in an empiricist vein, albeit not a positivist one. The 
empiricist vein consists in insisting on the fact that all the experimental evidence in physics 
comes down to relative positions of discrete objects and motion, that is, change of relative 
positions (see notably Bell 1987, pp. 166, 175). These axioms then are the answer to the 
question of what is a minimally sufficient ontology that accounts for this evidence. However, 
this is not positivism, because this approach does not employ the mathematical structure of 
physical theories to infer the ontology. 
The distance relation has to satisfy the triangle inequality (that is, for any three matter 
points i, j, k, the sum of the distances between i and j and j and k is greather than or equal to 
the distance between i and k). This is the only metrical requirement. The distance relation 
does not have to satisfy Euclidean geometry, or to have three or four dimensions. All this is a 
matter of representation and not of ontology. In other words, the distance relation is subject 
only to a minimal spatiality or extension constraint. Nonetheless, it is this constraint that 
makes it that the objects that are individuated by this relation are matter points. By contrast, 
points standing in, say, a primitive thinking relation would be Cartesian minds, etc. 
Consequently, the type of relation determines which type of objects are the relata. 
Furthermore, the distance relation is irreflexive, symmetric and connex (meaning that all 
matter points in a given configuration are related with one another). More importantly, for the 
distance relation to individuate the matter points, it has to satisfy the following requirement: if 
matter point i is not identical with matter point j, then the two sets that list all the distance 
relations in which these points stand with respect to all the other points in a configuration 
must differ in at least one such relation. It is such differences in the way in which i and j relate 
with the other points in the configuration that make it that i and j are different points. This 
requirement entails that the matter points are absolutely discernible. What is known as weak 
discernibility in the literature since Saunders (2006) is not sufficient for individuation, since it 
requires only that objects stand in an irreflexive relation, without there being anything that 
distinguishes one object from the other ones (see Bigaj 2015 for a recent overview of that 
debate). Consequently, by imposing this requirement, one avoids having to accept the 
plurality of matter points as a primitive fact, which would imply that the matter points are 
bare particulars or bare substrata. These relations also account for the impenetrability of 
matter without having to invoke a notion of mass: for any two matter points to overlap it 
would have to be the case that there is no distance between them. 
However, this requirement comes at a price. It implies that any model of this ontology has 
to include at least three matter points that are individuated by the distance relations. 
Consequently, symmetrical configurations are ruled out, but also, for instance, the 
configuration of an isosceles triangle. Nonetheless, this is no objectionable restriction: having 
empirical adequacy in mind, there is no need to admit worlds with only one or two objects or 
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entirely symmetrical worlds. To put the issue in other terms, axiom (1) proposes a structural 
individuation of objects: they are individuated by the relations in which they stand instead of 
intrinsic properties, or a primitive thisness (haecceity). As the literature on ontic structural 
realism has made clear, structures in the sense of concrete physical relations – such as 
distances – can individuate physical objects (see e.g. Ladyman 2007). The issue of structural 
individuation is independent of whether one conceives ontic structural realism in a radical 
manner, eliminating objects in the sense that they are nothing but nodes in a network of 
relations (Ladyman and Ross 2007, chs. 2 and 3, French 2014, chs. 5-7), or conceives it in a 
moderate manner, treating objects and relations on a par, being mutually ontologically 
dependent: relations require relata in which they stand, but all there is to the relata is given by 
the relations that obtain among them (Esfeld 2004, section 3, Esfeld and Lam 2011, 
McKenzie 2014). In both cases, to the extent that there are objects, they are individuated by 
relations. 
The point at issue here comes out clearly when one considers the tension that there is in 
ontic structural realism between the following two claims: 
(i) The symmetries that physical theories exhibit are the guide to the ontic structures. 
(ii) The ontic structures individuate physical objects. 
The tension consists in the fact that the higher a degree of symmetry a structure exhibits, the 
less it is in the position to individuate objects (Keränen 2001). This tension is general: it 
applies not only to spatial symmetries, but also, for instance, to quantum entanglement 
structures. In posing axiom (1), I propose to resolve this tension by abandoning claim (i). 
What we need structures in a parsimonious ontology for is to relate simple objects in such a 
way that the structures individuate the objects. In other words, the rationale for admitting 
structures in the ontology rests on claim (ii). Symmetries in physical theories then are 
important for representation. They are a means to achieve a description of the evolution of our 
universe that is both simple and informative: they entail a great improvement in simplicity 
with only a little loss in information about the actual configuration of matter of the universe, 
which is not symmetric. To put it in a nutshell: to obtain objects that are structurally 
individuated by the relations in which they stand, we need absolute discernibility; to obtain 
absolute discernibility, we have to ban symmetries in the sense of entirely symmetrical, global 
configurations from the ontology; doing so makes the ontology empirically adequate (since 
the actual configuration of matter of the universe is not symmetrical) without infringing upon 
the representational importance of symmetries. 
By posing axiom (1), this ontology endorses not only the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles, but also – Leibnizian – relationalism about space. According to Leibniz, 
distances make up the order of what coexists (see third letter to Newton-Clarke, § 4, in 
Leibniz 1890, p. 363; English translation Leibniz 2000). By adding axiom (2), this ontology 
follows also Leibniz on time: time derives from change. According to Leibniz, time is the 
order of succession (see third letter, § 4, and fourth letter, § 41 in Leibniz 1890, pp. 363, 376). 
Change, conceived as change in the distances among matter points that are permanent, does 
not presuppose any temporal notion. Nonetheless, change, thus conceived, is directed in the 
following sense: it goes from one particular state of the configuration of matter points 
consisting in certain distances among the matter points to another particular state of that 
configuration consisting in other distances among some matter points. Any such change may 
be reversible. Nevertheless, the actual change in the configuration is directed in virtue of the 
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fact that it goes from one specific state of the configuration to another specific state of the 
configuration. By contrast, there is no direction in the distance relations individuating matter 
points as given by axiom 1, since there is no spatial direction as long as there are only 
distance relations, but no space into which these relations are embedded. 
For change to be change in the distances that connect and individuate matter points, the 
matter points have to be permanent. If they were not permanent, a space-time would have to 
be presupposed in which matter point-events come into and go out of existence. Since the 
matter points are permanent, the change in the distance relations provides for the identity of 
the matter points in the configuration across all change. In other words, what makes i the 
same matter point through each state of the configuration is the way in which the relations it 
bears with respect to all the other matter points change. An appropriate manner to represent 
this identity therefore consists in depicting the matter points as moving on continuous 
trajectories. 
However, why is it not a more parsimonious ontology to merge the two axioms into one by 
replacing the distance relations with basic spatio-temporal relations? As mentioned above, the 
distance relation postulated in axiom (1) implements only a minimal spatiality constraint. 
Going for basic spatio-temporal relations, by contrast, obliges one to admit much more than 
that as primitive: there then are matter point-events forming continuous worldlines, with the 
points on each worldline being ordered according to earlier and later as a primitive matter of 
fact – otherwise, the relations would not be spatio-temporal ones. Again, such relations can 
individuate worldlines, and they do not have to satisfy Euclidean geometry, or to have four 
dimensions; all this is a matter of representation. Nonetheless, one cannot do without 
endorsing a primitive temporal, metrical requirement in this ontology, even if one casts it in 
relationalist terms instead of endorsing an absolute space-time: well-defined spatio-temporal 
intervals between non-simultaneous point-events have to be presupposed as primitive. Hence, 
temporal order is not derived from change, but change is derived from the order of the points 
on each worldline being temporal as a primitive matter of fact. 
If one puts the ontology set out in terms of the two axioms above into the framework of 
terms that are common in analytic metaphysics, the matter points are endurants because they 
persist without having temporal parts (but they do not have spatial parts either; they do not 
have any parts at all). Furthermore, since what exists is a spatial configuration of these matter 
points constituted by the distances among them, this is an ontology of presentism. However, 
employing these terms is misleading, since they presuppose time as a primitive. In this 
ontology, there is no time, but only change. What exists is a configuration of matter points 
individuated by distance relations that change. That change exists, but not a whole ordered 
stack of configurations of matter points – this is only a manner of representation of change. 
There only is one configuration of matter points of the universe, with the relations that 
individuate the elements of that configuration changing. This is the only reason why this 
ontology is akin to presentism. In any case, presentism, thus conceived, is the most 
parsimonious ontology, since only one configuration exists. To put it in a nutshell, this 
ontology achieves the best of two worlds: the Parmenedian world of eternal being and the 
Heraclitean world of change. The matter points are permanent; they do not come into being 
and they do not go out of being. But they are individuated by relations that change as a 
primitive matter of fact. 
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2. Minimalist ontology and physical theory 
So far I have been concerned with simplicity in the sense of parsimony or minimalism in 
ontology: distance relations individuating matter points, with these relations changing, while 
the matter points are permanent, is the first and foremost candidate for a most parsimoniuos 
ontology of the natural world that is coherent and empirically adequate. However, when it 
comes to representing that change in a physical theory, the conceptual means provided by this 
ontology are in general insufficient. Using only these conceptual means, one could not do 
much better than just listing the change that actually occurs, but not formulate a simple law 
that captures that change. 
The rationale for seeking for a law is simplicity in representation. In the ideal case, the law 
is such that given an initial configuration of matter as input, it yields a description of all the 
change of the configuration as output. However, in order to achieve such a law, we need more 
parameters than distances individuating matter points. The reason is that there is nothing 
about the distance relations in any given configuration of matter that provides information 
about the evolution of these relations. That is why further parameters – both geometrical and 
dynamical ones, over and above relative distances that change – have to be attributed to the 
configuration of matter points to obtain a dynamical law. Consequently, simplicity in ontology 
and simplicity in representation tend to pull in opposite directions. Using only the concepts 
that describe what there is on the simplest ontology (matter points individuated by distance 
relations), the description of the evolution of the configuration of matter would not be simple 
at all. Using the simplest description as guideline for the ontology – such as e.g. Newtonian 
mechanics –, the ontology would not be simple at all: it would in this case be committed to 
absolute space and time, to momenta, gravitational masses, forces, etc. 
To put this crucial issue differently, from the epistemological perspective, in metaphysics 
as well as in physics, one has to start from a few basic notions taken as primitive. One can 
elucidate what these notions mean – as done with the notion of distances individuating matter 
points in the preceding section –, but one cannot trace them back to other notions. These 
notions, then, make up the proposal for the ontology in the sense of what there simply is. It is 
in principle possible to do the whole of physics with just the notions of distances 
individuating matter points and change of these distances, but this would be uneconomical: no 
simple dynamical equation capturing that change could be thus achieved. It is therefore 
reasonable to introduce further notions that provide such information by being formulated in 
terms of their functional role for the change in the configuration of matter so that the 
representation of change becomes more simple without losing information. 
However, it is a misunderstanding to think that by introducing further notions one 
subscribes to ontological commitments that go beyond the ones given in terms of the basic 
notions. One can invoke the stance that is known as Humeanism in analytic metaphysics in 
order to illustrate why this is a misunderstanding. Hence, Humeanism enters here as a strategy 
to maintain scientific realism without building ontological commitments on the 
representational means that physical theories employ. In brief, if one takes the basic notions 
to define what is known as the Humean mosaic, one can conceive all the further notions that 
are needed to achieve a simple theory – both the geometrical and the dynamical ones – as 
being the means to obtain a representation of that mosaic that is simple as well as informative. 
The way in which the change in the configuration of matter occurs exhibits certain patterns 
or regularities. Conceptualizing these patterns or regularities, according to what is known as 
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the Humean best system account, the laws of nature are the theorems of the system that 
achieves the best balance between being simple and being informative in describing the 
evolution of the configuration of matter (see notably Lewis 1994, section 3, and Cohen and 
Callender 2009). More precisely, the proposal at hand here regards the parsimonious ontology 
of matter points individuated by distance relations and the change in these relations as the 
Humean mosaic. Hence, properties are banned from the mosaic: there are only the distance 
relations individuating point-objects. The geometry as well as the dynamical parameters that 
figure in a physical theory are treated in the same way as the laws: they come in through the 
role that they play in the laws, belonging to the means that are required to achieve a 
representation of the overall change in the distance relations that strikes the best balance 
between being simple and being informative about that change. This new version of 
Humeanism can be dubbed Super-Humeanism. While the standard Humean, following 
Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience (e.g. Lewis 1986a, pp. ix-x), holds that there are 
spatial or spatio-temporal relations connecting points and natural intrinsic properties 
instantiated at these points, the Super-Humean maintains that there are only sparse points that 
then are matter points with distance relations individuating these points; but neither is there an 
underlying space nor are there natural intrinsic properties.1 
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the laws of classical mechanics and classical 
electrodynamics are part of the best system. Mass, charge and other parameters figure in these 
laws. Both inertial and gravitational mass as well as charge are admitted in classical 
mechanics only because they perform a certain function as described by the laws of 
gravitation and electrodynamics, namely to accelerate the particles in a certain manner. In 
other words, they enter into classical mechanics through their nomological role in the laws. 
Hence, on Super-Humeanism, parameters like mass and charge are no addition to being. 
The configuration of point particles and its change is all there is. Given that this change 
exhibits certain patterns, laws can be formulated, and given the laws, one can attribute 
parameters like mass and charge to the point particles. But these are not properties that the 
particles have per se, as something essential or intrinsic to them. They obtain them only 
through the regularities that the change in the distance relations among them exhibits (see 
Hall 2009, § 5.2). That is to say: it is not mass and charge qua properties belonging to 
individual matter points that determine their trajectories by means of the causal role that they 
play in the laws of classical mechanics and electrodynamics; on the contrary, the trajectories 
that the matter points take throughout the evolution of the universe make it that parameters 
such as mass and charge figure in the dynamical laws such that a value of mass and charge 
applies to the matter points taken individually. Consequently, the particles are not intrinsically 
electrons, neutrons, etc. They can be so described because they move electronwise, 
neutronwise so to speak (see Esfeld et al. 2017). 
In other words, the distance relations among the point particles and the change in these 
relations make true all the true propositions about the natural world, including in particular 
the propositions expressing laws of nature. Hence, if the laws of classical mechanics figure in 
the best system, predicates such as “mass” and “charge” apply to the particles in virtue of the 
                                                
1 Castaneda (1980, p. 106) uses the term “super-Humean world”, meaning a view that does not regard 
energy (or forces) as something that exists in the world; but there is no rejection of absolute space or 
natural intrinsic properties considered in Castaneda. I’m grateful to Gordon Belot for suggesting the term 
“Super-Humeanism” for this view of a relationalism that rejects intrinsic properties of the spatial relata. 
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patterns that the particle trajectories exhibit. These predicates – as well as all the other ones 
appearing in the propositions that are true about the world – really apply, and the propositions 
really are true, there is nothing fictitious about them. But what there is – and hence what 
makes them true – is nothing over and above matter points individuated by distance relations 
and the change in these relations. 
In the same vein, Huggett (2006) has shown how geometry and inertial frames in classical 
mechanics come in as figuring in the best system describing the change in the spatial relations 
among point particles. Consequently, going for relationalism in classical mechanics does not 
oblige one to develop a theory of classical mechanics that is an alternative to Newtonian 
mechanics (as notably Barbour and his collaborators have done since the 1970s; see e.g. 
Barbour and Bertotti 1982). It is sufficient to interpret the absolute quantities appearing in 
Newtonian mechanics as being the means to achieve a best system representation of the 
change in the relative distances among point particles. In a nutshell, a relationalist ontology 
for classical mechanics can go with a non-relationalist physical theory (see notably Belot 
2011, pp. 60-77, for a critical assessment of the proposal of Huggett 2006). In any case, also a 
relationalist physical theory of classical mechanics requires more representational means than 
those provided by the sparse notions employed in the formulation of a parsimonious 
relationalist ontology in terms of the two axioms of the preceding section (e.g. Barbour’s 
theory requires primitive facts about angles in order to be entitled to the notion of the shape of 
a configuration on which his relationalist dynamics relies). 
A similar approach is available for general relativity. In brief, if one uses parsimony as the 
primary criterion for ontology and refuses to employ the mathematical structure of a physical 
theory to infer the ontology, as already mentioned in the previous section, relativity physics 
does not commit us to replacing distance relations (that implement only a minimal spatiality 
requirement) with spatio-temporal relations. Instead, one can regard even the curved 
geometry of general relativistic space-time as a means to represent the evolution of distance 
relations individuating matter points. In particular, although general relativity is not a theory 
of point particles, also in the case of purely gravitational phenomena – such as space-time 
singularities or gravitational waves –, all that is physically observable is the change of spatial 
relations among material bodies. Against this background, one can maintain that the 
relationship between the fundamental particle description and the effective field description 
(e.g. in terms of fluid dynamics) is one of coarse-graining (see Vassallo and Esfeld 2016). 
Generally speaking, starting from the parsimonious ontology defined in the previous section, 
it is an open issue whether the best system representing the evolution of the distance relations 
individuating matter points works with a dynamics of instantaneous particle interaction (as in 
Newtonian mechanics and in quantum entanglement) or a dynamics of retarded (and possibly 
also advanced) particle interactions that are mediated by fields (as in relativistic physics). 
Nonetheless, it seems that fields constitute a serious obstacle to this research programme. It 
seems that from classical electrodynamics on, fields are recognized on a par with particles as 
the stuff out of which the world is made. However, in the first place, note that an electric field 
is probed by the motion of a test charge subject to it (such as the electron in the wire), the 
double slit experiment in quantum mechanics is made apparent by sufficiently many particles 
hitting on a screen, etc. Consequently, entities that are not particles – such as waves or fields 
– come in as figuring in the explanation of the behaviour of the particles, but they are not 
themselves part of the experimental evidence. More importantly, an ontological commitment 
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to fields as mediators of particle interactions runs into both physical and philosophical trouble 
(see Lange 2002 for a good introduction to the debate about fields in physics and philosophy). 
As regards the physics, there is the problem of self-interaction: the field that a charge creates 
reacts back on that very charge, resulting in an infinite energy at the point of the charge; this 
mathematical problem motivates the search for a physical theory that works without the field 
variables (such as the theory of Wheeler and Feynman 1945). Furthermore, as Feynman 
(1966, pp. 699-700) stresses in his Nobel Lecture, fields spreads out to infinity, being defined 
everywhere in space-time, thus also in regions where there will never be any particles whose 
motion they influence. What then are the fields? Are they properties of space-time points, 
albeit not geometrical ones? Are they some sort of stuff filling all of space-time? 
If fields are properties of space-time points, one is committed to an absolute space or space-
time whose points instantiate the field properties (see Field 1985, pp. 40-42). Over and above 
the drawbacks that the commitment to an absolute space or space-time implies, geometrical 
properties are bona fide properties of space-time; but it is not clear to say the least how space-
time points can in addition have causal properties that influence only the motion of certain 
particles, namely the charged ones. If one conceives fields as a stuff filling space-time, one is 
committed to the view of a bare substratum of matter that, moreover, admits different degrees 
at different points of space-time as a primitive fact. As these issues show, one runs into new 
problems if one treats fields as being more than bookkeeping devices that summarize the 
effects of diachronic relativistic particle interactions in order to allow for an efficient 
description of physical systems in terms of well-defined initial data. 
In quantum mechanics, the wave function takes the place of the classical field parameter. It 
is here that the elegance of the Super-Humean treatment of the field parameter fully comes 
out. By contrast to the electromagnetic field, the wave function cannot be conceived as a field 
on three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time, since it does not attribute definite 
values to the points of that space or space-time. It is a field parameter defined on 
configuration space – in the last resort, due to quantum entanglement, the configuration space 
of the particle configuration of the universe. If one holds that this field parameter exists over 
and above the particle configuration, one runs into the problem of how a field on 
configuration space could influence the motion of particles in physical space. The Super-
Humean does not have this problem. 
To see this, let us cast Super-Humeanism in terms of the primitive ontology approach to 
quantum physics mentioned already at the beginning of section 1, with the primitive ontology 
being the distribution of matter in ordinary space. Bohmian mechanics is the most prominent 
primitive ontology approach, the primitive ontology being point particles that are 
characterized only by their relative positions in physical space. All other variables, including 
mass and charge, are situated on the level of the wave function. These particles move 
according to a deterministic law – the guiding equation – in which the wave function has the 
job to yield the particles’ velocities at any time t give their positions at t. This law is linked 
with a probability measure – the quantum equilibrium hypothesis – from which the quantum 
mechanical probability calculus follows.2 
                                                
2 See Dürr et al. (2013, in particular ch. 2) for Bohmian mechanics. See Dickson (2000), Allori et al. (2008) 
and Esfeld et al. (2014, 2017) for the Bohmian particles being characterized by their relative positions 
only. 
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The argument for the primitive ontology approach in general and the Bohmian formulation 
of quantum mechanics in particular is independent of Super-Humeanism and the 
considerations that speak in favour of parsimony in ontology: the argument is that this 
approach provides a cogent solution to the quantum measurement problem (see notably 
Maudlin 2010, 2015, Belot 2012). Applying Super-Humeanism to this approach, the claim 
then is that the primitive ontology of relative particle positions and their change is the 
complete ontology. The wave function is not an additional element of the ontology. It is not a 
physical entity that determines the motion of the particles. On the contrary, given the motion 
of the particles, the regularities that their motion exhibits make it that a wave function 
parameter figures in the best system laws capturing that motion. Miller (2014), Esfeld (2014), 
Callender (2015) and Bhogal and Perry (2017) have worked this stance out independently of 
one another. Super-Humeanism is distinct from instrumentalism about the wave function: the 
wave function is the central dynamical parameter, figuring in the law of motion for the 
particles, as well as being itself subject to an evolution according to a law (i.e. the 
Schrödinger equation). These laws then are linked, via the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, 
with the probability calculus in which the wave function is employed to calculate probabilities 
for measurement outcomes according to Born’s rule. In brief, the first and foremost role of the 
wave function is nomological instead of being an instrument to calculate probabilities; but its 
being nomological is interpreted in terms of the best system account of laws. Consequently, if 
something is nomological, this does not entail that it has an ontological status. 
A similar approach can be applied to quantum field theory: an ontology of a fixed number 
of permanent point particles that move according to a Bohmian guiding equation is in the 
position to yield the operator formalism of standard quantum field theory, in exactly the same 
way as Bohmian mechanics yields the operator formalism of textbook quantum mechanics. In 
brief, starting from an equilibrium state of the particle configuration in which the motion of 
the particles is not observable (the “vacuum”), what appears as particle creation and 
annihilation events is accounted for in terms of excitations of the equilibrium state (see Colin 
and Struyve 2007 and Deckert et al. 2016). 
To stress again, note that the ontology defined by the two axioms in the preceding section 
has a much wider scope than what is known as the primitive ontology approach to quantum 
physics. Notably, it is not tied to three-dimensional space; the distance relations defining this 
ontology are not wedded to a particular geometry. Thus, from the perspective of this 
ontology, the main objection to an ontology of only a wave function in configuration space 
(see Albert 2015, chs. 6 and 7) is not that the wave function only ontology lacks a primitive 
ontology in terms of objects that are localized in three-dimensional space. From the 
perspective of parsimony, the main objection is the uneconomical dualism of a space defined 
at least by topological relations and material entities (such as a wave function field) existing 
on that space that are defined in terms of some intrinsic features, which hence do not come 
out of the relations constituting that space. 
In sum, the ontology of matter points being individuated by distance relations and the 
change of these relations is able to cover all established physical theories from Newtonian 
mechanics to quantum field theory. It remains stable; what varies is the dynamical structure of 
physical theories, as we make progress towards finding physical theories that strike an ever 
better balance between being simple and being informative about the evolution of the 
configuration of matter. By distinguishing between simplicity in ontology and simplicity in 
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representation, we thus obtain a scientific realism that is much more robust against the 
objections from theory change and underdetermination than the scientific realism that seeks to 
infer ontology from the mathematical structure of physical theories. 
3. A loss in explanation? 
As mentioned in section 1, the reason for employing parsimony as the primary criterion for 
ontology is that for any candidate entity stemming from science – or common sense, or 
intuitions –, we need an argument why one should endorse an ontological commitment to that 
entity. Its being part of what is minimally sufficient to obtain an ontology of the natural world 
that is coherent and empirically adequate is the best argument for an ontological commitment. 
That argument is not trumped by the fact that in the dynamical structure of a physical theory, 
much more parameters figure than those representing the entities that are admitted in a 
minimalist ontology. The purpose of the dynamical structure of a physical theory is simplicity 
in representation, not ontology. The argument for admitting (some) of these other parameters 
to the ontology can therefore not be the mere fact of their appearing in the dynamical structure 
of an established physical theory, but that by including them in the ontology, one achieves 
deeper explanations than those that are possible in the framework of a minimalist ontology. 
The central issue in this respect is that the minimalist ontology as defined by the two 
axioms in section 1 has to endorse not only distances individuating matter points as primitive 
(axiom 1), but also all the change that occurs in the distance relations (axiom 2). It cannot 
provide any reason why that basic change happens as it does, although it can explain all the 
other phenomena in terms of change in the distance relations connecting simple point-objects. 
Of course, standard scientific explanation in terms of covering laws, or unification is also 
available to the Humean who is only committed to a Humean mosaic as given by these two 
axioms.3 The point at issue here is what may be dubbed “metaphysical explanation”, namely 
providing a reason for why the change that actually occurs in the configuration of matter of 
the universe happens, and not some other change. Admitting laws as further primitives to the 
ontology (see notably Maudlin 2007), tracing that change back to modal properties of the 
basic entities such as dispositions or powers with the laws representing these dispositions or 
powers (see notably Mumford 1998, 2004 and Bird 2007), or to modal structures that are 
instantiated by the configuration of the basic entities with the laws representing these 
structures (see notably French 2014, chs. 9 and 10) are the main candidates for additional 
ontological commitments that deliver such a reason. 
However, in subscribing to such commitments, one does not provide an explanation of the 
change in the distance relations that is illuminating by contrast to accepting that change as a 
primitive as does the Humean. It is true that one traces that change back to modal properties 
of the matter points, modal structures instantiated by their configuration, or laws endorsed as 
primitive. But all these are defined in terms of the causal role that they exert for the motion of 
matter. The explanations hence are circular. For instance, one does not give a deeper 
explanation of attractive particle motion – i.e. answer the question why attraction happens in 
addition to subsuming it under unifying laws – in terms of mass or the gravitational force, 
because these are defined through the effect that they have (or can have or are the power to 
have) on the motion of the particles. By the same token, one does not give a deeper 
                                                
3 For the debate about explanations in Humeanism, see Loewer (2012) and then Lange (2013), Marshall 
(2015) and Miller (2015). 
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explanation of quantum non-locality in terms of a modal structure of quantum entanglement, 
because this structure is defined in terms of correlating the possible ways in which the 
quantum objects that instantiate this structure can evolve. The same goes for laws admitted as 
primitive. All this is an instance of the scheme at which Molière pokes fun in Le malade 
imaginaire: one does not explain why people fall asleep after the consumption of opium by 
attributing a dormitive power to opium – although, of course, mass and charge, or quantum 
entanglement are sparse, fundamental properties or structures by contrast to the 
phenomenological properties of opium. Nonetheless, the Molière argument hits also these 
latter properties or structures: like the dormitive power of opium, they are defined in terms of 
the effects that they bring about under certain conditions – in other words, by the functional or 
causal role that they exercise for the evolution of the objects to which they are attributed. 
The situation is similar when it comes to an ontological commitment to substantival space. 
For instance, Maudlin (2007, pp. 87-89) takes length of a path in absolute space as the 
primitive notion and derives the notion of distance of point particles from that notion as the 
minimal path length connecting them, claiming that he is thereby able to explain the 
constraints on the distance relation (such as the triangle inequality). The concern, however, is 
that one does not in this way provide a deeper explanation of the distance relation: in order to 
be able to define a minimal path length in space, one has to presuppose a structure that is rich 
enough to accommodate a metric – as the relationalist has to presuppose a relation that is rich 
enough to fulfill the triangle inequality in order to count as distance relation. If one employed 
a primitive notion of path that does not permit a definition of minimal length, then one could 
not derive the distance relation from such a notion of path. 
In all these cases, the additional ontological commitment has the consequence that what is 
contingent on the minimalist ontology comes out as necessary on the richer ontology: the 
Euclidean geometry is necessary given an underlying Euclidean space, the attractive motion 
of the particles is necessary given masses and the gravitational force, non-local correlations 
are necessary given a structure of entanglement, etc. However, lifting the status of something 
from contingent (because accepted as primitive matter of fact) to necessary does not yield a 
deeper explanation. It only creates drawbacks stemming from the fact that a surplus structure 
is endorsed – as in the case of a substantival space that stretches out to infinity, primitive laws 
or modal structures that may be uninstantiated, dispositions or powers that may not be 
manifested or that may cancel each other out (such as gravitational attraction and 
electromagnetical replusion between two particles cancelling one another out in certain 
specific situations). 
Furthermore, artificial problems are raised as to how the modal entities do the trick of 
making matter move in a certain manner. For instance, how can a particle make other 
particles across space move in a certain manner in virtue of dispositions or powers that are 
intrinsic to it? Invoking fields as ontological mediators of particle interaction to answer that 
question is of no help, as mentioned in the previous section. Moreover, how can a wave 
function, being a field in configuration space, make matter in physical space move in a certain 
manner? French (2014, p. 230) and Ladyman and Ross (2007, pp. 159-161) are prepared to 
concede that it is not possible to distinguish concrete physical from abstract mathematical 
structures; but if this were so, it would be a fatal blow to ontic structural realism as a proposal 
for the ontology of physics by contrast to the ontology of mathematics (see Briceno and 
Mumford 2016). In a nutshell, the objection is that by being committed to modal, dynamical 
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structures existing in nature, one reifies what is the mathematical representation of the 
evolution of the configuration of matter to a mysterious structure behind the scene of the 
changing distance relations that binds the motions of the material objects together. 
4. Conclusion: the merits of minimalism 
The case for a minimalist ontology as set out in this paper can be summed as follows: 
1. Ontological commitments require giving a reason. Since necessity is out of our cognitive 
reach, minimal sufficiency for a coherent and empirically adequate ontology of the natural 
world is a good reason. An ontology of distance relations individuating matter points and 
change in these relations meets this standard. 
2. Such an ontology is an instance of scientific realism. It is able to cover all known physics, 
providing a minimal set of entities that form an ontology of the natural world that matches 
our well-established physical theories. Furthermore, this ontology is by far less exposed to 
the objections to scientific realism from underdetermination and theory change than rival 
proposals that take the dynamical structure of physical theories as the basis to infer the 
ontology. 
3. Enriching the ontology does not yield additional explanatory value, but creates only 
drawbacks and artificial problems stemming from the surplus structure one is then 
committed to. 
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